This study investigates the effect of globalisation on governance in 51 African countries for the period 1996-2011. Four bundled governance indicators and four globalisation (political, economic, social and general) variables are used. The empirical evidence is based on Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions. The motivation for the estimation technique is that blanket governance-globalisation policies are not likely to succeed unless they are contingent on initial levels of governance and tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of governance. The following findings are established. First, globalisation promotes good governance. Second, for the most part, the effect of globalisation is higher in terms of magnitude in the bottom quantiles of the political, institutional and general governance distributions. Third, the impact of globalisation is overwhelmingly higher in terms of magnitude in the top quantiles of the economic governance distribution.
Introduction
There are five main reasons for engaging this inquiry, namely: (i) growing levels of poverty in Africa, the role of good governance in the reduction of poverty and the influence of globalisation in the quality of institutions in developing countries; (ii) gaps and debates in the literature on the globalisation-governance nexus; (iii) evolving paradigms in the conception and measurement of governance and (iv) the need to account for initial levels of governance in the modelling exercise in order to provide more targeted policy implications.
First, poverty has been increasing in Africa since the 1990s. This was revealed by a 2015 World Bank report on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which established that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa where, 45% of Sub-Saharan African countries were substantially off-track from reaching the MDG extreme poverty target (see Beegle et al., 2016; Asongu and Nwachukwu 2017a) . This evidence of extreme poverty is in sharp contradiction with the narrative that for over two decades, Africa has been enjoying a growth resurgence (see Fosu 2015a, 44) . Moreover, good governance has been documented to be instrumental in mitigating extreme poverty (Fosu 2015b (Fosu , 2015c 1 and the process of globalisation also influences the quality of Checks and balances between countries can also be shaped by globalisation such that, nations with less effective governance structures are assessed by other nations involved in bilateral or multilateral trade. Ultimately, such mutual oversight is transmitted to enhance governance structures among countries that are linked by mechanisms of globalisation. In addition, the growing technology that has been fuelling globalisation can enable countries with low levels 1 There is an abundant supply of literature on the linkage between good governance and inclusive development. Good governance is important in establishing strong foundations of social change (Efobi 2015) and raising standards of living through more effective management of economic resources (Fosu 2013; Anyanwu and Erhijakpor 2014; Fonchingong 2014) . 2 According to Tchamyou (2016) , globalisation is a process that is ineluctable and can only be neglected by jeopardizing the prosperity of nations.
of governance to catch-up their counterparts with higher levels of governance (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016a) . For example, corruption can be better managed via information exchange on corporations between countries and individuals with some track records of corruption.
Second, the globalisation-governance nexus is still subject to intense debate.
Accordingly, in spite of the hypothesised positive effect of globalisation on governance standards, controversies are apparent in the literature on the role of globalisation in improving governance structures. For example, McMillan (2013) has established that institutional reforms in Africa have been driven by globalisation. The positive role of globalisation in governance has been established in a broad sample of developing (Lalountas, Manolas and
Varouras 2011) and African (Asongu 2014a) countries. Conversely, with progress in technology that is driven by globalisation, poor governance has been observed to escalate because of growing networks of individuals and countries. These networks constitute complex webs of corruption that are hard to monitor (Goredema 2009; Shapiro and Levine 2015) .
Third, the conception of governance has evolved in recent literature, especially with respect to the debate on the Washington Consensus (that prioritises political governance) versus the Beijing model (which prioritises economic governance) (see Asongu 2016a; Asongu and Ssozi 2016) . On the one hand, the notion of governance has been used without a comprehensive conception and measurement. For example, "corruption-control" which is an aspect of institutional governance has been used by Kangoye (2013) as "governance". On the other hand, the concepts of institutional, political, economic and general governances have been used in the literature without a comprehensive measurement (Kaufman, Kraay, Mastruzzi 2007a , 2017b . This has resulted in conceptually flawed notions of governance and statistically falsifiable inferences. For example, it is conceptually inappropriate to use the term "economic governance" unless it translates a composite variable that is composed of government effectiveness and regulation quality. We address this conceptual shortcoming by using four bundled governance indicators, namely: institutional governance (consisting of the rule of law and corruption-control); economic governance (entailing regulation quality and government effectiveness); political governance (encompassing "voice and accountability"
and "political stability/non violence") and general governance (comprising institutional, economic and political governances). Hence, general governance is an embodiment of the six dimensions of governance.
Fourth, it is important to account for initial levels of governance in the assessment of the governance-globalisation nexus because blanket governance-globalisation policies are not very likely to be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of governance and tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of governance.
In the light of the above, this inquiry contributes to the literature by assessing the role of globalisation in governance. More comprehensive concepts of governance are employed, with particular emphasis on countries with low, intermediate and high levels of governance.
The research question addressed is the following: how does globalisation affect governance when existing levels of governance matter? In order to address this question, two main methodological steps are considered. First, we use bundled concepts of governance by means of principal component analysis. Second, quantile regressions are employed which enable the study to assess the linkages throughout the conditional distributions of governance.
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidence on the relationship between governance and globalisation. The data and methodology are covered in Section 3 while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes with implications and future research directions.
Theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidence
We discuss two main strands in this section, namely: (i) the nexus between governance and globalisation and (ii) factors connecting globalisation to governance which are engaged in three strands. The strands are discussed in chronological order.
First, with regard to the relationship between governance and globalisation, an important concern that is worthwhile to articulate is that globalisation affects the perceptions of governance within a country. According to Klitgaard (1988) and Asongu, Efobi and Tchamyou (2018) , poor governance is very likely to be entrenched in the presence of monopolistic power which is often characterised with discretion and low accountability. Poor governance and mismanagement are not so apparent in countries in which economic incentives are the outcome of perfect competition. Under this scenario, poor governance can be reduced when economic operators depend on the discretions of some officials and/or when economic agents and governments operating monopolies are within strict rules of accountability (Asongu 2014a) . It has also been documented that the protestant ethic, especially from a political perspective is generally linked to higher levels of governance (see Bonaglia, Macedo and Bussolo 2001; Treisman 2000) 3 . Conversely, poor governance is more detrimental within the framework of federalism, when a country's democratic basis is less open, especially to international trade (Klitgaard 1998 ).
Second, with regard to factors connecting globalisation to governance, according to Bonaglia, Macedo and Bussolo (2001) and Krueger (1974) , financial and trade globalisation could determine the equilibrium between benefits and costs, through a number of theoretical channels which we discuss in three main channels. The first mechanism emphasises rentseeking activities that are caused by trade restrictions. Contrary to quotas, tariffs and some official permission, imports are associated with substantial economic rents owing to monopolistic powers that legal importers are endowed with. In attempts to share such rents, agents within an economy could either compete on legal terms or take part in illegal rentseeking, smuggling, corruption, black market participation and bribery. It has been demonstrated by Krueger (1974) that such activities of rent-seeking could constraint some economic activities to evolve below optimal thresholds. This could also generate some differences between private and social costs and therefore, result in additional welfare costs, in addition to tariff restrictions. The seminal idea of Krueger was generalised in subsequent studies to a theory of tariffs (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1980) and profit-motivated activities that are not productive (Bhagwati 1982) .
The relationship between corruption and trade restrictions has been investigated by Gatti (1999) . The author has disentangled two effects of inward-oriented corruption policies, namely: direct policy distortion and foreign competition. High barriers to international trade have a direct influence on the capacity of public officials to exchange "foreign competition and policy distortion" for bribes. Ultimately, this engenders low competition between domestic and foreign firms which is conducive for high rent-seeking, corruption and poor management.
The second strand on the competition-decreasing mechanism has been discussed by Ades and Di Tella (1999) . They dispute that from specific and general perspectives, the degree of rent-seeking in markets affect aspects of poor governance. The authors have gone further to postulate that since variations in the level of rents are also traceable to the intensity competition, such competition should affect corruption in various ways. For instance, an 3 The protestant ethic is generally more associated with liberalism, capitalism, private property rights and need hold the executive accountable (Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 2016) . According to the narrative, Weber argued that capitalism in Northern Europe was fundamentally promoted by the desire for people to work in a more secular world: accumulating investment and wealth from the development of free enterprise and trade.
environment that is characterised with low competition (and hence, high rents) can increase the quantity of bribes obtained by bureaucrats. Conversely, within the same analytical framework, a country would receive more development rewards by augmenting the accounting and monitoring of its bureaucracy. According to the authors, it is important to compute the net effect of dimensions of poor governance (e.g. corruption). This is essentially because opposing tendencies are apparent. Nigeria is used by the authors to illustrate an eloquent example of how rent-seeking and corruption are associated. Accordingly, for more than three decades, approximately 75% of government revenue has been from petroleum exports (Nworu, 2017 high levels of corruption in order to compensate for reduced purchasing power and (iii) political instability.
The impacts of development assistance and public investment are debatable. The impact of public investment on governance depends on among others: the type of governance variable and the manner in which disbursed funds are managed. For example, funds that are allocated to provide public commodities could enhance economic governance. Meanwhile, if the disbursement of corresponding funds is related to corruption and mismanagement, it is very likely that the impact on institutional governance will be negative. On the perspective of foreign aid, while Okada and Samreth (2012) income counterparts) enjoy better levels of governance (Asongu, 2012) .
The definitions and sources of variables are disclosed in Appendix 1, the summary statistics in Appendix 2 whereas Appendix 3 provides the correlation matrix. From Appendix 3, it is apparent that some of the control variables are not employed because of multicollinearity issues or high degrees of substitution. The unused control variables are:
mobile phone penetration; secondary school enrolment and population growth.
Methodology

Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
Consistent with the motivation on the need to employ composite measurements of institutional quality, we use PCA in order to bundle the six governance indicators form Kaufman, Kraay, Mastruzzi (2011) The Jolliffe (2002) and Kaiser (1974) criterion is employed to retain common factors.
According to the criterion, only common factors which have an eigenvalue greater than the mean should be retained. As apparent in Table 1 and N need to be sufficiently large. However, they do not explicitly disclose how "large should be large". Two concerns related to this merit emphasis in this study. On the one hand, it is not very feasible to extend N much further because almost all African countries have been engaged. On the other hand, extending T is also not very feasible for two main reasons:
(i) 1996 cannot be discounted further as the starting year because good governance indicators from the World Bank are only available from 1996 and (ii) the end year is 2011 because of constraints in data availability at the time of the study.
In addition to the above justifications that are related to data availability constraints, recent empirical literature has employed PC-augmented variables with far lower values of N and T than in the current study. These studies include: (i) Asongu (2016b) 
Quantile regressions
In accordance with the motivation which is to assess the governance-globalisation relationship when existing levels of governance matter, the study is consistent with the employing an estimation technique that accounts for existing levels of governance. Moreover, studies emphasising mean effects by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are based on the assumption that the error terms are normally distributed. This assumption does not hold for the QR approach because the technique is not based on the assumption of normally distributed error terms. Therefore, the approach enables this study to assess the globalisation-governance relationship with specific emphasis on countries with low, intermediate and high levels of governance. This technique which is robust in the presence of outliers enables the assessment of parameter estimates at multiple points of the conditional distribution of governance (Koenker and Bassett 1978) .
We address the concern of endogeneity by using an Instrumental Variable QR (IVQR). The instrumentation procedure for globalisation is in Eq.
(1) below.
where, 
where   
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation is analogous to variables. An example of a model that requires the underlying identification process for proper specification is the Generalised Method of Moments.
Empirical results
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively present findings corresponding to political governance, economic governance, institutional governance and general governance. Each table is presented in four panels: the first-two on the top present "political globalisation"-and "economic globalisation"-related regressions in respectively the left-hand-side and righthand-side. Consistent differences in globalisation estimated coefficients between OLS and quintiles (in terms of sign, significance and magnitude of significance) justify the relevance of adopted empirical strategy.
The following findings can be established from Table 2 on the relationship between political governance and globalisation dynamics. First, globalisation positively affects political governance. Second, the effect of globalisation is higher in terms of magnitude in the bottom quantiles of the governance distribution, compared to top quantiles, with a thin exception of top quantiles in "political globalisation"-related regressions in the top-left-handside that are not significant. Third, the significant control variables have the expected signs.
The following findings can be established from Table 3 on the nexus between economic governance and globalisation dynamics. First, globalisation has a positive influence on economic governance. Second, the effect of globalisation is higher in terms of magnitude in the top quantiles of the governance distribution, compared to bottom quantiles, with a thin exception of top quantiles in "social globalisation"-related regressions in the bottom-lefthand-side for which the distinction is not apparent. Third, most of the significant control variables have the expected signs.
The following findings can be established from Table 4 on the effect of globalisation dynamics on institutional governance. First, globalisation has a positive effect on institutional governance for the most part. Second, the effect of globalisation is higher in terms of magnitude in the bottom quantiles of the institutional governance distribution, compared to top quantiles. There is a small exception of "economic globalisation"-related regressions in the top-right-hand-side for which estimates are not significant in the bottom quantiles. Third, most the significant control variables have the expected signs. The following findings can be established from Table 5 on the effect of globalisation dynamics on general governance. First, globalisation has a positive effect on general governance, for the most part. Second, the effect of globalisation is higher in terms of magnitude in the bottom quantiles of the general governance distribution, compared to top quantiles. A small exception is in "economic globalisation"-related regressions in the topright-hand-side for which estimates are not significant in the bottom quantiles. Third, most the significant control variables have the expected signs. 0.020*** 0.032*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.006 -0.017*** 
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Concluding implication and future research direction
This study attempted to address the research question: how does globalization affect governance when existing levels of governance matter? To do so, I have used: Based on the findings, globalization does indeed promote good governance. Second, for the most part, the effect of globalization is higher in terms of magnitude in the bottom quantiles of political, institutional, and general governance distributions. Third, and overwhelmingly, the impact of globalization is higher in terms of magnitude in the top quantiles of the economic governance distribution. It is important to emphasize how these findings improve scholarly understanding of the conception and definition of governance in the light of the motivation of this paper which is to articulate an evolving paradigm shift in the conception of governance. Prior to these established findings, the positive association between general governance (political, economic, institutional and general) and globalization would have been lacking in empirical validity. Hence, we have provided the empirical validity with which to substantiate the connection between these concepts of governance and globalization.
This clarification is particularly useful because it has been argued by Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017c) that the concept of "general governance" is used without empirical validity in the literature. We have shown from the findings that the positive association between globalization and general governance withstands empirical scrutiny. Furthermore, the concept of general governance used in this paper entails all the six dimensions of governance from World Governance Indicators of the World Bank.
The above discourse also extends to the use of other composite governance concepts.
For instance, empirical validity is also important because constituents of the composite governance variables we have employed translate different perspectives in the real world. For instance, political governance has often conflated been with "strong democracy" (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016d) . Unfortunately "strong democracy" is only the "voice and accountability" dimension of political governance. Let me substantiate this perspective with an example: while most African countries may be better in terms of "voice and accountability" when compared to China, China comparatively enjoys more political stability which is important for the effects of globalization on political governance. Hence, this study also falls within the framework of a theory-building exercise by arguing that since constituents of employed composite governance indicators are heterogeneous across geographical and political contexts, it is important to always substantiate policy implications with empirical findings that are void of conceptual conflation.
In the light of the findings, this inquiry hopes to contribute to the literature in its assessment of the role of globalization on governance by using novel concepts of governance with particular emphasis on countries with low, intermediate, and high levels of governance. and globalization influences state and nonstate (Hu and Chan 2002) or domestic institutions (Ju and Wei 2011) . In essence, the findings hope to provide the beginnings of a holistic approach to the conception and measurement of governance that employs a plethora of globalization indicators while conditioning the investigation on existing levels of governance.
One of the main policy implications of this study is that existing levels of governance influence how globalization affects governance standards. To put this implication into greater perspective, from the angle of political governance: (i) the positive effect of political globalization on political governance is apparent exclusively in countries with below-median levels of political governance while (ii) for the other globalization dimensions (economic, social and general), the positive effect on political governance is lower in terms of magnitude in countries with above-median levels of political governance. It follows that, countries with averagely lower initial levels of political governance benefit more in terms of political governance when compared to their counterparts with averagely higher levels of political governance. In summary, the positive responsiveness of political governance to globalization is a decreasing function of above-median levels of political governance. The tendency or comparative advantage of countries with below-median levels of political governance can be extended to other investigated linkages between globalization and governance. Exceptions to this extension include, the: (i) effect of economic globalization on economic, institutional and general governance and (ii) impact of political globalization on economic governance.
In the light of the above, compared to countries with higher levels of governance, for the most part, globalization would benefit countries with lower levels of governance more. It Eritrea; Ethiopia; Guinea; Somalia; Sudan and Zimbabwe.
In the light of the above, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the main characteristics in below-median are civil wars or political instability. As shown by Asongu (2014b) , compared to the rest of the world, political strife, conflicts and civil wars have substantially affected governance standards in Africa: Angola (1975 Angola ( -2002 ; Burundi (1993 Burundi ( -2005 ; Chad It is important to note that countries with above-median levels of political stability which have witnessed substantial political instability in the stylized facts from Asongu Of the four reasons motivating this study, three have already been discussed in this concluding section in the light of findings, namely: (i) an evolving paradigm in the conception of governance; (ii) gaps and debates in the literature and (iii) need to account for initial levels of governance. In the light of the above clarifications, we conclude by articulating the connection of the findings with the missing fourth motivation of poverty reduction. Given the consensus on the role of good governance in human development (Efobi 2015; Fosu 2013; Anyanwu and Erhijakpor 2014; Fonchingong 2014) , in the post-2015 sustainable development era, sampled countries that adopt inclusive globalization policies are very likely to enjoy inclusive development due to enhanced globalization-driven governance. 
Appendices
